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Abstract
This paper evaluates aggregate-level partisan change in presidential and midterm elections at the
county level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. Specifically, this analysis focuses on how
demographic, electoral, cultural, and economic variables affect the percentage of the electorate
voting for the Democratic Party candidates for U.S. President and other statewide offices from
1990 through 2016. In addition, this study conducts sub-state regional analyses using U.S.
Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to assess the local nature of partisan change in the
U.S. OLS regression and correlation coefficients, as well as difference of means test results
indicate that increases in population density over time and the presence of a county in a large
U.S. Census MSA of one million people or more increases average Democratic Party vote
percentages. Moreover, increases in the African American population in counties is an important
positive factor for Democratic Party average vote percentages. On the other hand, increases in
median age and median household income decrease Democratic Party vote percentages. Since
1990, there has been a substantial erosion of Democratic Party support across counties outside of
MSAs, particularly in midterm elections. Overall, the results illustrate the growing
urban/suburban and rural partisan divide in the U.S. at the county level.
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The Evolution of Partisan Voting at the County Level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, 19902016
I. Introduction
The 2016 presidential election illustrated the growing divide between urban and rural
America. Rural counties across the country voted overwhelmingly for Republican Donald
Trump, while central city and highly educated suburban counties shifted to the Democrats. This
paper evaluates the extent and causes of county-level partisan change in presidential and
midterm elections in the states of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas from the 1990 midterm elections
through the 2016 presidential election cycle. The focus is on analyzing aggregate county-level
voting behavior in each of the three states and in sub-state urban regions. This paper assesses
how demographic, electoral, cultural, and economic factors explain changes in Democratic Party
vote percentages at the county level over time.
The study of partisan change and realignment has been an important part of the literature
on U.S. elections and electoral behavior since the seminal works of V. O. Key (1955; 1959) in
the 1950s. According to Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie (2006, p. 497),
[R]ealignment is a dramatic change in the partisan expressions of
constituencies and communities. The change is long lasting. It
can occur suddenly, as with a critical realignment, or over time in a
secular realignment. Realignment is not necessarily a change in
the actual partisan identification of individuals, but of the
composition of partisan preferences and choices made by the
electorate in constituencies or groups.
Key (1955; 1959) formulated two key theories explaining partisan political change in the U.S.
First, Key (1955, p. 11) developed the concept of a “critical” realignment, which is a substantial,
sudden, and durable partisan voting behavior movement occurring in a single election. Key
(1959) further augmented his realignment theory by identifying a second form of realignment,
which he termed “secular.” Secular realignments reflect gradual changes in the voting behavior
of voters across multiple elections (Key 1959). According to Key (1959, p. 199), “[a] secular
shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the members of a population
category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be
independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections.” In addition, Key
(1959, p. 203) explains why secular realignments occur. In Key’s (1959, p. 203) study, he found
that “[t]he infusion of new elements in the population” led to secular changes in party support.
Key (1959) noted that the in-migration of newcomers into an area did not immediately result in
election changes. Rather, electoral change gradually occurred over time due to the demographic
changes (Key, 1959, p. 203).
Why do the core voting blocks of political parties change over time? The two main
explanations for the occurrence of realignments are the conversion and mobilization hypotheses.
According to the conversion thesis, realignments occur because existing voters change their
partisan affiliation and voting tendencies to begin supporting another political party (Burnham
1970; Ladd and Hadley 1978; Sundquist 1983). The second explanation for realignment, the
mobilization thesis, argues that changes in the strength of political parties is due to new voters in
an area. The group of new voters may include the young, new residents, and previously
unengaged and disillusioned citizens. The addition of these new voters can change the election
dynamics to favor one party over another even if conversion of existing voters is minimal (Key
2
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1955; Campbell et al. 1960; Petrocik 1981; Beck 1982; Campbell 1985; Carmines and Stimson
1989).
There is an important sub-focus in the realignment literature on regional and local
realignments, often with an emphasis on the South (e.g., Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie 2006;
Bullock 2010a; Bullock 2010b; Darmofal and Nardulli 2010; Nardulli 1995). Bullock (2010a)
notes that a regional secular realignment is occurring in the South, a process beginning in the
period following World War II. According to Bullock (2010a), partisan politics in the South
revolve largely around race with Democrats winning most African American voters and
Republicans garnering a large majority of white voters. For example, in Georgia, Bullock
(2010b, p. 62) notes that in the past Democrats maintained control in the state by maintaining at
least 40 percent support from whites and overwhelming support from African Americans. As the
white vote percentage dropped, Republicans began to win at the statewide level in Georgia in the
1980s and 1990s.
In addition, a number of studies (e.g., Black and Black 2002; Knuckey, 2006) have
found a shift since the 1960s among southern whites away from the Democratic Party to the
Republican Party, resulting in a secular realignment in many areas of the South. The civil rights
legislation of the 1960s, President Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,” increases in socioeconomic status for southern whites, changes in cultural values and ideology, and a substantial
in-migration of new residents into the region from other parts of the country are important
factors explaining the ascendency of Republicans in the South (Campbell, 1977, pp. 37-38;
McKee and Hayes, 2009, p. 402; Knuckey, 2006, pp. 58-61). Overall, the voting behavior
literature documents realignments occurring more on a regional than national basis. The South,
in particular, has been undergoing realignment toward the Republican Party since the 1960s.
Moving forward, this study assesses changes in the Democratic Party vote percentages in
presidential and midterm elections at the county level dating back to 1990 in three states,
Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. Why is more research needed for voting trends at the county level?
States are often large and diverse jurisdictions with many different areas within a state voting
differently. For instance, suburbs and central city counties often diverge in voting trends. A
solid Republican state could have significant concentrations of Democratic support, which is
important for understanding sub-state political races, such as for U.S. House, for state legislature,
and for county offices. The concentrations of minority party support in a state may be evolving
so that in the future the changes occurring at a local county level could result in a realignment at
the state level. For instance, counties in and around a large metropolitan area may be growing
and diversifying much faster than counties in the rest of the state (e.g., Metropolitan Atlanta
counties in Georgia). The dramatic county-level changes may eventually result in a change in
statewide partisan control.
This paper analyzes sub-state regions (i.e., U.S. Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas of
one million people of more) to more thoroughly assess causes of county level partisan change.
Beck (1982) and Darmofal and Nardulli (2010) note the importance of studying realignment at a
local or regional level, and this study seeks to contribute to the voting behavior literature by
furthering this line of research by focusing on county-level partisan change. Moreover, this
study seeks to illustrate the growing political “red-blue” divide in America. Recent survey data
(e.g., Pew Research Center 2015) and research (e.g., McKee and Teigen 2009) indicate that
Americans are increasingly polarized along “red” Republican and “blue” Democratic lines
particularly with regard to living in rural/urban areas, age, and region of the U.S. The growing
urban/suburban and rural divide was evident in the 2016 presidential election with Republican
3
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Donald Trump winning overwhelmingly in rural and blue collar counties and Democratic
nominee Hillary Clinton making in-roads into traditionally Republican suburban areas in large
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).
In order to assess the dynamics of county partisan change in three U.S. states, this paper
addresses the following research questions:
(1) What variables explain changes in the Democratic Party average vote percentages at
the county level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, during the period 1990-2016?
(2) How do aggregate-level Democratic Party vote percentages at the sub-state level vary
between MSA and non-MSA counties?
Pursuing answers to these questions is critical for explaining the importance of local partisan
change. County level variations in partisan support levels may be masked by the focus on
statewide election results, particularly in presidential races. The Democratic Party vote
percentage change is used in this study as the dependent variable to gauge two-party vote change
over time at the county jurisdictional level. The Republican Party vote percentages could also be
used to conduct the same type of analyses. The Democratic vote was chosen since previous
works in this area have often focused on how various groups have left the Democratic Party
since the 1930s. For decades from the 1930s through the 1980s, the Democratic Party was the
dominant political party at the state and local levels in the U.S. In the 1990s, the Republican
Party began to make large inroads into local jurisdictions, particularly in the South and in rural
areas.
II. Explaining Aggregate-level Voting Behavior
This paper uses sets of factors cited in the voting behavior literature to evaluate partisan
change. First, the demographic characteristics of a county are typically influential in
determining aggregate-level partisan voting trends in an area. The Michigan model of voting
(Campbell et al. 1960) lays out a social-psychological framework for explaining partisan voting
based on long-term factors such as party identification and demographic characteristics,
including race, gender, and social class. The Michigan model holds that these long-term political
and social-psychological characteristics of voters result in consistent and predictable voting
patterns when it comes to voting for one of the two major political parties. Previous research
studies (e.g., Knuckey 2006; McKee and Hayes 2009, Darmofal and Nardulli 2010) suggest that
county-level demographics, particularly increases in the non-white population, are closely linked
to party identification. Numerous studies find a strong positive relationship between increases in
the African American and overall nonwhite vote in an area and increases in Democratic Party
vote strength (Pew Research Center, 2015; Campbell, 2002; McKee and Teigen, 2009). Overall,
it is expected that increases in the non-white populations of counties result in increases in
Democratic Party average vote percentages.
H1: It is hypothesized that increases in the percentage of the population who are African
American result in increases in Democratic Party vote percentages.
H2: It is hypothesized that increases in the percentage of the population who are Hispanic result
in increases in Democratic Party vote percentages.
Additional demographic variables that may affect partisan voting tendencies for
jurisdictions are the socio-economic status (SES) characteristics of an area. SES measures,
4
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which are indicators of social class, typically include income level, occupational prestige, and
educational attainment. Previous research studies indicate mixed results with regard to the
impacts of SES factors on partisan voting behavior. On the one hand, some research suggests
that higher socio-economic status individuals often vote more for Republicans than for
Democrats (e.g., Key 1955; Campbell 2002; Knuckey 2006; Hawley 2015). On the other hand,
some research studies indicate that increases in educational attainment are positively related to
Democratic vote increases. For instance, McKee and Teigen (2009, p. 493) in an analysis of the
2004 presidential election in the South at the county level found that increases in the percentage
of the population with a Bachelor’s degree resulted in decreases in Republican voting. Overall,
in total, the existing evidence slightly tilts toward the conclusion that higher socio-economic
status is positively related to voting Republican.
H3: It is hypothesized that increases in educational attainment levels in counties are negatively
related to increases in Democratic vote percentages.
Moreover, age is a demographic factor potentially affecting voting tendencies in
jurisdictions in the U.S. Studies have found that older voters tend to align more with the
Republican Party while younger voters lean toward Democrats in greater numbers (Campbell
2002, p. 223; McKee and Hayes 2009, pp. 405-406). McKee and Hayes (2009, pp. 405-406) in a
study of how southern Democratic and Republican primary voters are changing found that 60
percent of Republican primary voters were aged 45 or older in 2008 compared to 53 percent for
the Democrats. The electorate age difference in primary elections between the parties is an
indicator that older voters are gravitating more toward the Republican Party than the Democratic
Party. In addition, Campbell (2002, p. 223) found a positive relationship between increases in
age and Republican Party voter identification. Therefore, as the population of a county becomes
older, it is expected to become more Republican and less Democratic leaning.
H4: It is hypothesized that increases in median age in counties are negatively related to increases
in Democratic vote percentages.
Moreover, cultural factors related to urbanization are expected to be influential for
explaining aggregate-level partisan voting. Polling and academic research indicate an
increasingly stark divide between citizens in urban metropolitan areas and those in rural areas
(Gimpel and Karnes, 2006, p. 467). Studies indicate that increasing urbanization and population
density are associated with increases in Democratic Party voting (e.g., Campbell 2002; McKee
and Teigen 2009). McKee and Teigen (2009, p. 486) note that urbanites …
are more likely to self-identify as liberals because tolerance is a
way of life as well as an effective coping mechanism when living
is such a varied setting. Routine exposure to a variety of people
undoubtedly sets in motion a different socialization process than
the one present in a rural setting.
In addition, Hawley (2015, p. 64) notes that “[i]t has also been argued that differences in
communities’ built environments can shape political attitudes” and that “crowded urban areas
encourage people to hold more egalitarian and liberal political attitudes.” Since urban areas tend
to have a broader mix of diverse people than rural places, it is expected that the Democratic Party
percentage of the vote will increase in higher population density jurisdictions, such as counties in
5
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large U.S. Census MSAs, and decrease in lower density rural areas outside of these urban
regions.
H5: It is hypothesized that increases in the number of people per square mile (population
density) in counties are positively related to increases in Democratic Party vote percentages.
H6: It is hypothesized that Democratic Party vote percentages are higher in counties in large
MSAs than in counties outside of large MSAs.
Finally, economic factors, such as the unemployment rate and changes in income levels,
have been found to influence voting in elections (Blackley and Shepard, 1994; Abrams and
Butkiewicz, 1995; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). There is a line of thought that holds that
voters are rational self-interested actors seeking to maximize their own benefits relative to costs.
The rational self-interest motives of voters leads them to support candidates most in-line with
their current personal economic situations. Blackley and Shepard (1994, p. 366) note that “selfinterested voters are more likely to prefer a new president if they are experiencing
unemployment or income losses…” It is expected that increases in income levels benefit
Republicans more than Democrats as people associate Republicans more with proposals to cut
taxes and increase income levels.
H7: It is hypothesized that increases in median household incomes in counties result in lower
Democratic Party vote percentages.
III. Methods
As noted earlier in this paper, the dependent variable is the average percentage change in
the Democratic Party vote for presidential and gubernatorial candidates in midterm and
presidential elections at the county level. The variable is created by averaging vote percentages
for the same type of election (presidential or midterm gubernatorial) over three election cycles.
The average of election vote percentages, often referred to in the electoral realignment literature
as the “normal vote” (Converse, 1966), provides a foundation for measuring aggregate-level
partisan change in counties (Key 1955, 1959; Converse, 1966; Campbell 1977; Campbell 1985;
Darmofal, 2008; Darmofal and Nardulli 2010). Converse (1966) developed the “normal vote”
concept as part of the Michigan School to measure the extent of partisan change over time in a
jurisdiction. A “multi-election averages” approach used by Darmofal and Nardulli (2010, pp.
262-263) is utilized in this study to calculate the average “normal vote” percentages for the
Democratic Party at the county level. Campbell (1977, p. 60) originally noted the need to use
several different preceding elections for estimating a core vote for a political party in order to
reduce the impact of short-term factors in any single election. The “multi-election averages”
methodology averages together a number of previous election results for a political party to
reduce the effects of short-term factors (such as a controversy or presence of an unpopular
incumbent President) on any one particular election result.
For the purposes of this paper, the average percentage change in Democratic Party voting
is calculated separately for midterm and presidential election years. The average of consecutive
election vote percentages is completed to minimize the impact of a single election on the
analyses. Campbell (1985, p. 362), for instance, averaged the Democratic presidential votes in
1928, 1932, and 1936, to gauge the extent of the Democratic realignment in the 1930s. In this
6
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paper, the change in presidential election percentages is calculated by subtracting the 2000
presidential election average (the average of the 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections)
from the 2016 presidential election average (the average of the 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections).
The percentages are based on the Democratic Party share of the major two-party (Democratic
and Republican) vote. Moreover, the change in gubernatorial (midterm) election percentages is
calculated by subtracting the 1998 gubernatorial election average (the average of the 1990, 1994,
and 1998 elections) from the 2014 average for gubernatorial midterm elections (average of the
2006, 2010, and 2014 election). The percentages are based on the Democratic Party share of the
major two-party (Democratic and Republican) vote.1 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for
the dependent variable.
In addition, in this study, demographic, electoral, cultural, and economic factors are used
to assess county-level partisan change in the states of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas during the period
spanning from 1990 through 2016. Demographic factors in this paper are variables measuring
race, age, and educational attainment levels. First, the African American change in percentage of
the population, 2000-2015, is an independent variable calculated using the change in the
percentage of the total population between 2000 to 2015 who are African American (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2017b). Second, the Hispanic change in percentage of the population, 2000-2015, is
calculated by the change in the total population percentage between 2000 to 2015 who are
Hispanic (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b). A third independent variable, the median age change
(years) from 2000-2015 is figured by the median age of the population change (in years) between
2000-2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b). Moreover, the educational attainment change variable
is calculated as the change in the percentage of the population 25 years of age and over with a
Bachelor’s degree or higher between 2000 and 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b).
In addition, other types of variables measuring the differences between midterm and
presidential election cycles, population density, urbanity, and income levels are calculated and
used in the analyses in this paper. An electoral factor, a dichotomous variable distinguishing
presidential and midterm election cycles, is used to highlight differences in voting between MSA
and non-MSA counties in each state in Table 5. Moreover, this study uses cultural factors
focused on “urbanity” to assess how increases in population density and county MSA status
affect Democratic Party voting. The population density change variable is calculated as the
change in population per square mile of land (number of people) from 2000 to 2015 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2017b). The Urban/suburban (“urbanity”) variable is created based upon U.S.
Census Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) populations with a “1” for counties in MSAs with
more than one million people and a “0” for counties not in a MSA or one million or more
people.2 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a). Finally, the economic indicator of median household
income is used to examine if economic concerns play a role in voting. The median household
income variable is the percentage change in median household income in counties from 2000 to
2015 (not adjusted for inflation) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b).
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide results of OLS regression analyses testing the hypothesized
relationships among the different variables. In addition, difference of means tests (Table 5) and
correlation analyses (Table 6) are conducted to test relationships among different variables. In
the data analyses in this paper, the OLS regression assumptions of linearity, normal distribution,
and lack of multicollinearity were met. The presence of some outlier counties in Texas creates a
modest heteroskedasticity issue in the Texas models. This situation reduces the precision of the
coefficient estimates for Texas counties. In Tables 5 and 6, difference of means and correlation
analyses are presented to supplement the OLS regression findings.
7
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The states of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas are chosen for use in this paper because they
provide representative examples of the different types of demographic changes occurring in the
U.S. in contemporary politics. The states of Georgia and Texas highlight suburban areas that are
quickly growing and diversifying, and are gradually realigning toward the Democratic Party at a
local level. On the other hand, Ohio illustrates a different situation with low growth in most
areas, declining populations in central cities and suburban areas typically Democratic in nature,
and a graying of the electorate overall, which tends to benefit the GOP over time. While other
states could be used to illustrate these divergent types of changes occurring at the local county
level within states, these three states are regarded as either current or emerging partisan
battlegrounds for the 2020 elections. So, the sub-state changes occurring in these three states
may have a profound impact on future elections, particularly for U.S. President, while similar
changes in states such as California and New York would likely not result in profound national
political changes. In addition, in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, the growing divide between urban
and rural areas is clearly illustrated, particularly during the Donald Trump Presidency. The
Republican Party vote percentage has jumped dramatically in rural counties in all three states,
while Democratic strength, particularly in the fast growing and diverse metropolitan areas of
Georgia and Texas, have been moving toward the Democrats. In particular, suburban counties
around cities such as Atlanta, Austin, Dallas, and Houston, once Republican strongholds, are
now becoming battleground counties. The changes occurring in these suburban counties were
illustrated in the 2016 and 2018 elections. While the changes were not enough to change the
Republican dominance in these states in statewide elections, there was a clear tightening of
statewide vote margins between Democrats and Republicans because of changes in suburban
counties.
Finally, in aggregate-level analyses, care needs to be taken to avoid the “ecological
fallacy” problem of applying aggregate-level changes to individual-level voting behaviors. The
focus in this paper is on assessing county-level data, and not on trying to predict how individuals
behave in elections. Counties are used in this aggregate-level study of voting as the unit of
analysis because, as McKee and Teigen (2009, p. 488) note, “… they are the smallest geographic
unit for which reliable demographic and political data are available.” U.S. Census data is widely
available for counties, but not for precincts. In addition, precinct and other local government
borders change across time making comparisons across different election years problematic.

IV. Findings
The findings of the analyses of county-level data from Georgia, Ohio, and Texas are
illustrated in Tables 2 through 6. OLS regression results for President and Governor (midterm)
for all counties in the three states are provided in Table 2. Tables 3 and 4 lay out OLS regression
results for counties by large U.S. Census MSA status. Moreover, Table 5 provides an illustration
of difference in means between MSA and non-MSA counties for President and Governor in the
three states covered in this paper. Finally, Table 6 provides bivariate correlation coefficients for
the variables in this study.
The first research question asked, what variables explain changes in the Democratic Party
average vote percentages at the county level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, during the period
1990-2016? First, race is a moderately important factor determining Democratic Party vote
outcomes in the various OLS regression, difference of means, and correlation analyses in Tables
2 through 6. As the proportion of the overall electorate who are African American increases in a
8
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county, Democratic Party average vote percentages increase over time. However, many of the
coefficients are not statistically significant. The most consistent impact of race on Democratic
Party vote results is in Georgia with every one percentage point increase in the proportion of the
population being African American resulting in about a half percentage point increase in the
average Democratic Party vote (Table 2). In addition, there is a similar effect in the MSA
counties of Georgia, which compose the Atlanta metropolitan region (Table 3). In Ohio, for
President, there is a positive coefficient for both the African American and Hispanic variables.
However, the other coefficients are not statistically significant. The Texas results are not
statistically significant except for a small positive correlation coefficient in Table 6 for President.
Overall, increases in the African American population is a positive influence on Democratic
voting, but the results are not consistently significant across elections. The Hispanic impact is
negligible, but is likely to become more important as Hispanics begin to participate in higher
numbers in future elections in the fast growing and diversifying states of Georgia and Texas.
Another important factor for aggregate-level voting outcomes is educational attainment,
which is a measure of socio-economic status. It was expected that increases in socio-economic
status would be associated with lower Democratic Party vote percentages. The OLS regression
coefficients in this paper illustrate a mixed picture of the effect of SES on the Democratic vote.
The majority of the coefficients are not statistically significant. Of those that are significant,
results from Georgia suggest a negative relationship between increases in educational attainment
and Democratic Party vote percentages, while results from Ohio indicate a positive relationship.
The Texas results are statistically insignificant. The results indicate that in multivariate analyses,
specific independent variables are more important in one state than another.
Furthermore, as hypothesized, the variable measuring increases in the median age of
voters in counties is negatively related to increases in Democratic Party vote percentages in
presidential elections in Georgia and Ohio. However, the majority of coefficients across the
three states are statistically insignificant. Based on the OLS regression results (Tables 2 and 3),
increases in median age reduce Democratic Party vote percentages in presidential elections,
indicating that an aging population in a county is a positive factor for Republicans. The
correlation coefficients are negative in Georgia and Ohio, and insignificant in Texas (Table 6).
Overall, the findings suggest that an aging population in a county favors Republicans, while a
younger electorate is more beneficial to Democrats.
In the OLS regression models of Tables 2, 3, and 4, the most consistent and important
variable for explaining changes in the Democratic Party average vote percentages in counties is
increases in population density. A related factor that is assessed in Table 5 are the differences in
Democratic Party vote percentages in counties in large U.S. Census MSAs and counties in rural
and smaller urban areas. As hypothesized, increases in population density are positively
associated with increases in the Democratic Party average vote percentages in presidential and
gubernatorial elections in MSA and non-MSA counties in the three states. While not all of the
OLS regression coefficients are statistically significant, they are consistently in the positive
direction and the beta coefficients indicate that population density is the most important factor
for explaining changes in Democratic Party average votes. The correlation coefficients in Table
6 suggest a moderately strong, positive relationship between increasing population densities and
increases in support for the Democratic Party. These findings indicate that increasing
urbanization and population density enhances Democratic Party vote percentages in urban and
suburban counties in large MSAs.
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Moreover, in Table 5, the difference of means results indicate that Democratic Party
support is substantially higher in large MSA counties, on average, than in non-MSA counties.
The county Democratic Party vote averages for MSA and non-MSA counties are statistically
different for President across the three states, but only statistically significant for Governor in
Texas. For President, there is a substantially large decline in Democratic Party vote percentages
for President in non-MSA counties, suggesting a growing urban/suburban and rural partisan
divide in the three states for Democrats. However, for gubernatorial elections held during
midterm election cycles, there is very little difference in Democratic Party vote percentages
between large MSA counties and counties outside of large MSA regions, except in Texas. The
presidential election results illustrate a meaningful difference between urban/suburban and rural
counties, but the differences are less pronounced in midterm gubernatorial elections. The
differences between presidential and gubernatorial elections is likely due to higher turnout and a
more diverse electorate participating in presidential than in midterm elections. The presidential
electorate advantages Democrats more than does the composition of the typical midterm
electorate.
Finally, changes in median household income is a moderately important factor for
explaining Democratic Party support at the county level. Overall, there is a consistent negative
relationship (except for gubernatorial elections in Texas) between increases in median household
income and Democratic Party average vote percentages. Democratic Party support generally
drops as the median household income increases. This result suggests that there is a small selfinterest motivation for voters in elections, with Republicans generally benefitting from increases
in income levels.
Moreover, the second research question in this study focused on the question of how do
aggregate-level Democratic Party vote percentages at the sub-state level vary between MSA and
non-MSA counties? In Table 5, MSA and non-MSA average vote percentage changes for
different offices for the Democratic Party vote are presented for presidential and midterm
gubernatorial elections. For presidential elections, there are substantial, statistically significant
differences between counties in urban/suburban MSA regions of one million people or more and
counties outside of these large MSAs. For instance, in Georgia, the average change in the
Democratic Party percentage average of the presidential vote between 2000 and 2016 was -5.99
percent, compared to -12.56 for non-MSA counties. Similar results are present for Ohio and
Texas. However, for midterm elections for Governor, the differences between MSA and nonMSA counties in Georgia and Ohio are not statistically significant. Only for Texas, is there a
statistically significant difference showing less decline in MSA counties than in non-MSA areas.
The difference of means results in Table 5 illustrate presidential and midterm elections are
fundamentally differently. The Democratic Party vote percentage is stronger in the higher
turnout presidential elections than in the lower turnout midterm elections, but the results vary
considerably across states, MSA/non-MSA counties, and type of election.
Overall, the results in Tables 2 through 6 for presidential and gubernatorial elections
indicate that changing demographics are having significant impacts on election results. Increases
in the non-white populations of counties is a positive factor for increasing Democratic Party
strength. On the other hand, increases in median age and in median household income are
negatively related to increases in Democratic Party vote averages. In addition, and more
importantly, increasing population density per square mile, a measure of urbanization, is a
positive factor for Democratic Party vote percentages in both presidential and midterm election
cycles. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 5, there are substantial differences between large MSA
10
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counties and non-MSA counties across the three states analyzed. The differences between
counties in large MSAs and those outside of these areas are less pronounced in lower turnout
midterm gubernatorial elections.
V. Conclusions
V. O. Key in the 1950s identified critical and secular partisan realignment processes for
explaining long-lasting and durable voting behavior changes (Key 1955, 1959). In addition,
Nardulli (1995) and others (e.g., Jackson and Carsey, 1999; Darmofal, 2008; Darmofal and
Nardulli, 2010) found that partisan realignments are often local or regional phenomena. In this
paper, the local nature of partisan changes are evaluated with a focus on county-level aggregate
voting behavior. Since the 1990 elections, significant changes have occurred at the county level
in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. The most significant finding is that increasing urbanization is
fundamentally changing politics by enhancing the urban-rural divide in American politics. The
divide is more apparent in high turnout presidential elections than in lower participation midterm
elections for state governor. In particular, increases in population density over time and the
presence of a county in a large U.S. Census MSA of one million people or more increases the
average Democratic Party vote percentages for presidential and gubernatorial races. This is most
noticeable in Tables 3 and 4 where increases in population density in Georgia and Texas are
associated with increased in the Democratic vote. Since the populations of Georgia and Texas
are growing faster than in Ohio, this is an expected occurrence. In addition to urbanization
processes, increases in the African American population in counties has an important positive
effect on Democratic Party average vote percentages. On the other hand, increases in median
age and median household income at the county level results in decreases in the Democratic
Party vote. However, turnout rates for nonwhite voters matter, and power shifts at the statewide
level may not occur in the near future due to most statewide offices being elected in midterm
elections with lower turnouts and more favorable Republican electorates.
In conclusion, this aggregate-level assessment of partisan voting in counties in Georgia,
Ohio, and Texas illustrates the growing political “red-blue” divide in America. Demographic
and other aggregate changes are often analyzed at a statewide level, but the true magnitude of
these changes are better viewed using county-level data. The diverse and high population “core”
counties of large MSA regions are moving toward Democrats, even though some of the counties
at an aggregate-level still vote Republican overall. The less populated and less diverse counties
outside of major MSAs are moving in an opposite direction toward Republicans. The results
from this study illustrate the propensity of voters to sort themselves into similar like-minded
communities, and in the states analyzed, the county-level voting data indicate that the “Red
State” and “Blue State” divide is relevant in local counties as well as at the state level.

11
Published by Carroll Collected,

11

The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 25 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

References
Abrams, Burton A., and James L. Butkiewicz. 1995. “The Influence of State-level Economic
Conditions on the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election.” Public Choice 85: 1-10.
Beck, Paul Allen. 1982. “Realignment Begins? The Republican Surge in Florida.” American
Politics Quarterly 10(4): 421-438.
Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 2002. The Rise of Southern Republicans. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Blackley, Paul R, and Edward M. Shepard III. 1994. “A Statistical Analysis of the Effect of
State-level Economic Conditions on the 1992 Presidential Election.” Public Finance
Quarterly 22 (3): 366-382.
Bullock III, Charles S., Donna R. Hoffman, and Ronald Keith Gaddie. 2006. “Regional
Variations in the Realignment of American Politics, 1944-2004.” Social Science
Quarterly 87(3): 494-518.
Bullock III, Charles S. 2010a. “Introduction: Southern Politics in the Twenty-first Century.” In
Mark J. Rozell and Charles S. Bullock III, eds., The New Politics of the Old South: An
Introduction to Southern Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bullock III, Charles S. 2010b. “Georgia: A Study of Party and Race.” In Mark J. Rozell and
Charles S. Bullock III, eds., The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to
Southern Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics. New
York: Norton.
Campbell, David E. 2002. “The Young and the Realigning: A Test of the Socialization Theory
of Realignment.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 66(2): 209-234.
Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American
Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Campbell, Bruce A. 1977. “Change in the Southern Electorate.” American Journal of Political
Science 21(1): 37-64.
Campbell, James E. 1985. “Sources of the New Deal Realignment: The Contributions of
Conversion and Mobilization to Partisan Change.” The Western Political Quarterly
38(3): 357-376.
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and Transformation
of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Converse, Philip E. 1966. “The Concept of the Normal Vote.” In Angus Campbell, Philip
Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, eds., Elections and the Political Order.
New York: Wiley.
Darmofal, David. 2008. “The Political Geography of the New Deal Realignment.” American
Politics Research 36(6): 934-961.
Darmofal, David, and Peter F. Nardulli. 2010. “The Dynamics of Critical Realignments: An
Analysis across Time and Space.” Political Behavior 32(2): 255-283.
Florida Department of State. 2017. “Election Results Archive.” Available at:
http://dos.myflorida.com/elections/data-statistics/elections-data/election-results-archive/
[Accessed November 10, 2017].
Georgia Secretary of State. 2017. “Current and Past Election Results.” Available at:
http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/Elections/current_and_past_elections_results [Accessed
November 10, 2017].
Gimpel, James G., and Kimberly A. Karnes. 2006. “The Rural Side of the Urban-Rural Gap.”
12
https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol25/iss1/1

12

Shock: The Evolution of Partisan Voting at the County Level

PS: Political Science and Politics 39(3): 467-472.
Hawley, George. 2015. White Voters in 21st Century America. New York: Routledge.
Jackson, Robert A., and Thomas M. Carsey. 1999. “Presidential Voting Across the American
States.” American Politics Quarterly 27(4): 379-402.
Key, V. O., Jr. 1955. “A Theory of Critical Elections.” Journal of Politics 17: 3-18.
Key, V. O., Jr. 1959. “Secular Realignment and the Party System.” Journal of Politics 21: 198210.
Knuckey, Jonathan. 2006. “Explaining Recent Changes in the Partisan Identification of
Southern Whites.” Political Research Quarterly 59(1): 57-70.
Lacombe, Donald J., and Timothy M. Shaughnessy. 2007. “Accounting for Spatial Error
Correlation in the 2004 Presidential Popular Vote.” Public Finance Review. 35(4): 480499.
Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley. 1978. Transformations of the American Party
System. New York: Norton.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2000. “Economic Determinants of Electoral
Outcomes.” Annual Review of Political Science 3: 183-219.
McKee, Seth C., and Danny Hayes. 2009. “Dixie’s Kingmakers: Stability and Change in
Southern Presidential Primary Electorates.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39(2): 400417.
McKee, Seth C., and Jeremy M. Teigen. 2009. “Probing the Reds and Blues: Sectionalism and
Voter Location in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections.” Political Geography
28: 484-495.
Nardulli, Peter F. 1995. “The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and
Political Change.” American Political Science Review 89(1): 10-22.
North Carolina State Board of Elections. 2017. “Election Results.” Available at:
https://www.ncsbe.gov/Election-Results [Accessed November 10, 2017].
Petrocik, John R. 1981. Party Coalitions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pew Research Center. 2015. “Party Identification Table.” A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation.
Available at: http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-affiliation/
[Accessed on February 4, 2018].
Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System. Washington, DC: Brookings.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2017a. “Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas: 2010-2016.”
Available at: https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/total-metro-andmicro-statistical-areas.html [Accessed on November 10, 2017].
U.S. Census Bureau. 2017b. “American Community Survey (ACS).” Available at:
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ [Accessed Nov. 10, 2017].

13
Published by Carroll Collected,

13

The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 25 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable, Change in Democratic Vote
Percentages*
State
Election
N
Mean
Minimum Maximum Standard
type
(Std. Error)
deviation
Georgia
President
159
-11.36
-29.27
25.38
10.37
(0.82)
Governor
159
-17.27
-36.50
20.56
9.51
(0.75)
Ohio
President
88
-6.04
-21.96
11.59
6.20
(0.66)
Governor
88
7.32
-4.94
20.75
4.51
(0.48)
Texas
President
254
-14.06
-34.73
12.03
10.00
(0.63)
Governor
254
-7.94
-26.51
10.54
7.06
(0.44)
*The data in this table reflect changes in the average vote percentages for Democratic Party
candidates for President of the U.S. (2000 to 2016) and Governor (1998 to 2014).
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TABLE 2: Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Average Vote Percentages for
U.S. President and Governor (All Counties in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas), 1990-2016a
INDEPENDENT
President Governor President Governor President Governor
VARIABLES
(Georgia) (Georgia) (Ohio)
(Ohio)
(Texas) (Texas)
African American change in 0.525** b 0.441**
1.073*
percentage of population, (0.149) c
(0.146)
(0.539)
2000-2015 0.273 d
0.251
0.170
Hispanic change in -0.140
-0.259
3.020**
percentage of population, (0.278)
(0.272)
(0.818)
2000-2015 -0.036
-0.073
0.333
Educational attainment -0.283
-1.077** 1.019**
(Bachelor’s degree or (0.264)
(0.258)
(0.247)
higher) percentage change -0.076
-0.314
0.320
in population, 2000-2015
Median age change (years), -0.659*
-0.285
-0.472
2000-2015 (0.328)
(0.321)
(0.317)
-0.141
-0.067
-0.117
Population density change 0.043** 0.027**
0.008
(number of people) per (0.010)
(0.010)
(0.009)
square mile, 2000-2015 0.349
0.242
0.067
Median household income -0.119*
-0.120* -0.195**
percentage change, 1999- (0.059)
(0.058)
(0.058)
2015 -0.142
-0.156
-0.274

0.922
(0.572)
0.200
1.444
(0.868)
0.218
0.364
(0.262)
0.157

0.345
(0.354)
0.056
0.014
(0.145)
0.006
-0.092
(0.195)
-0.028

-0.215
(0.262)
-0.050
-0.037
(0.107)
-0.021
-0.056
(0.144)
-0.024

0.497
(0.336)
0.169
-0.016
(0.009)
-0.192
-0.010
(0.061)
-0.020

-0.346
(0.220)
-0.094
0.058**
(0.007)
0.467
0.017
(0.032)
0.031

0.126
(0.163)
0.048
0.038**
(0.005)
0.431
0.056*
(0.024)
0.146

ADJ. R2
N
F-STATISTIC
CONSTANT

0.370
0.281
0.572
0.093
0.224
0.149
159
159
88
88
253
253
16.436** 11.283** 20.393**
2.492
13.096** 8.338**
-7.643** -11.384** -7.903**
1.921 -15.309** -11.187**
(2.068)
(2.024)
(2.538)
(2.692)
(2.028)
(1.497)
Significance (two-tailed): *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01
a
Dependent variable: Percentage change in the three-election average vote for the Democratic
Party presidential or gubernatorial candidate spanning elections from 1990 through 2016. See
Table 1 for the operationalization of the variable.
b
Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients
c
Standard errors
d
Standardized beta coefficients
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TABLE 3: Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Average Vote Percentages for
U.S. President (MSA and Non-MSA Counties in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas), 1990-2016a
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

MSA
Counties President
(Georgia)

African American change in 0.662** b
percentage of population, (0.225) c
2000-2015 0.410 d
Hispanic change in -1.394
percentage of population, (1.140)
2000-2015 -0.188
Educational attainment 0.180
(Bachelor’s degree or (0.633)
higher) percentage change 0.037
in population, 2000-2015
Median age change (years), 0.317
2000-2015 (1.484)
0.029
Population density change 0.050**
(number of people) per (0.015)
square mile, 2000-2015 0.494
Median household income -0.700*
percentage change, 1999- (0.275)
2015 -0.444

Non-MSA
MSA
Non-MSA
MSA
Non-MSA
Counties - Counties - Counties - Counties - Counties President President President President President
(Georgia) (Ohio)
(Ohio)
(Texas)
(Texas)

-0.104
(0.263)
-0.039
-0.492
(0.305)
-0.162
-0.214
(0.297)
-0.064

0.913
(0.811)
0.263
-0.133
(1.985)
-0.017
0.925*
(0.435)
0.349

0.980
(0.949)
0.104
3.537**
(0.872)
0.410
0.290
(0.348)
0.074

1.081
(0.957)
0.186
-0.467
(0.803)
-0.103
0.134
(0.754)
0.030

0.148
(0.373)
0.025
0.035
(0.146)
0.016
-0.219
(0.204)
-0.070

-0.801*
(0.351)
-0.222
0.080**
(0.027)
0.275
-0.104
(0.060)
-0.156

-2.728*
(1.218)
-0.590
-0.000
(0.010)
-0.004
-0.183
(0.254)
-0.188

-0.383
(0.332)
-0.111
0.059
(0.036)
0.151
-0.235**
(0.058)
-0.396

-0.005
(0.854)
-0.001
0.037**
(0.009)
0.623
-0.077
(0.152)
-0.089

-0.329
(0.224)
-0.099
0.192**
(0.031)
0.395
0.034
(0.033)
0.069

ADJ. R2
N
F-STATISTIC
CONSTANT

0.749
0.120
0.657
0.520
0.519
0.158
29
130
20
68
35
218
14.920** 3.937** 7.069** 13.120** 7.122** 7.812**
-5.066
-6.722**
6.725
-5.621
-7.352 -16.901**
(6.270)
(2.229) (11.984) (2.869) (10.881) (2.053)
Significance (two-tailed): *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01
a
Dependent variable: Percentage change in the three-election average vote for the Democratic
Party presidential or gubernatorial candidate spanning elections from 1990 through 2016. See
Table 1 for the operationalization of the variable.
b
Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients
c
Standard errors
d
Standardized beta coefficients
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TABLE 4: Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Average Vote Percentages for
Governor (MSA and Non-MSA Counties in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas), 1990-2016a
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

MSA
Counties Governor
(Georgia)

African American change in 0.510 b
percentage of population, (0.263) c
2000-2015 0.338 d
Hispanic change in -2.578
percentage of population, (1.332)
2000-2015 -0.371
Educational attainment -0.186
(Bachelor’s degree or (0.739)
higher) percentage change -0.040
in population, 2000-2015
Median age change (years), -0.100
2000-2015 (1.734)
-0.010
Population density change 0.048*
(number of people) per (0.018)
square mile, 2000-2015 0.507
Median household income -0.764*
percentage change, 1999- (0.321)
2015 -0.517

Non-MSA
MSA
Non-MSA
MSA
Non-MSA
Counties - Counties - Counties - Counties - Counties Governor Governor Governor Governor Governor
(Georgia) (Ohio)
(Ohio)
(Texas)
(Texas)

-0.038
(0.245)
-0.015
-0.428
(0.285)
-0.149
-1.023**
(0.278)
-0.325

-0.058
(0.933)
-0.022
2.718
(2.283)
0.465
0.175
(0.500)
0.087

1.106
(1.084)
0.143
0.850
(0.995)
0.120
0.872*
(0.397)
0.270

0.398
(0.673)
0.113
-0.358
(0.565)
-0.130
-0.557
(0.530)
-0.203

-0.315
(0.284)
-0.073
-0.035
(0.111)
-0.022
-0.128
(0.155)
-0.056)

-0.447
(0.327)
-0.131
0.015
(0.025)
0.054
-0.090
(0.056)
-0.143

-0.155
(1.401)
-0.044
-0.007
(0.011)
-0.162
-0.254
(0.292)
-0.342

0.576
(0.379)
0.203
-0.048
(0.041)
-0.151
0.007
(0.067)
0.015

0.176
(0.601)
0.051
0.023**
(0.007)
0.636
0.077
(0.107)
0.145

0.118
(0.170)
0.049
0.101**
(0.023)
0.286
0.067**
(0.025)
0.184

ADJ. R2
N
F-STATISTIC
CONSTANT

0.608
0.142
0.220
0.068
0.352
0.077
29
130
20
68
35
218
8.240** 4.5567**
1.895
1.817
4.074** 4.037**
-5.492 -10.416** 10.038
0.071
-4.644 -12.058**
(7.326)
(2.081) (13.781) (3.274)
(7.658)
(1.562)
Significance (two-tailed): *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01
a
Dependent variable: Percentage change in the three-election average vote for the Democratic
Party presidential or gubernatorial candidate spanning elections from 1990 through 2016. See
Table 1 for the operationalization of the variable.
b
Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients
c
Standard errors
d
Standardized beta coefficients
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TABLE 5: Comparing Mean Averages in MSA and Non-MSA Counties a
Change in Democratic Party Average
Nonb
Vote for President: 2000 to 2016
MSA
MSA Sig.
Georgia (N=159; MSA counties = 29,
Non-MSA counties = 130)
-5.99 -12.56 **
Ohio (N=88; MSA counties = 20, NonMSA counties = 68)
-1.19
-7.47 **
Texas (N=254; MSA counties = 35, NonMSA counties = 219)
-6.31 -15.29 **
Change in Democratic Party Average
Vote for Governor (Mid-term
elections): 1998 to 2014

MSA

NonMSA

Sig.

Georgia (N=159; MSA counties = 29,
Non-MSA counties = 130)

-15.44

-17.68

NS

Ohio (N=88; MSA counties = 20, NonMSA counties = 68)

7.45

7.28

NS

Texas (N=254; MSA counties = 35, NonMSA counties = 219)
-2.78
-8.77 **
Significance: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 NS = Not significant
a Average county vote percentage for MSA and non-MSA
counties
b MSA counties in Georgia are the 29 counties composing the AtlantaSandy Springs-Roswell MSA. No other MSA in Georgia exceeds one
million people.
Springs-Roswell MSA. No other MSA in Georgia exceeds one million
people.
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TABLE 6: Bi-variate Correlations (Pearson’s r)
GA: Dem.
Pres. Vote
Average
Percentage
Change,
2000-2016

OH: Dem.
Pres. Vote
Average
Percentage
Change,
2000-2016

TX: Dem.
Pres. Vote
Average
Percentage
Change,
2000-2016

African American 0.505**
change in
percentage of
population, 20002015
Hispanic change in
0.141
percentage of
population, 20002015
Educational
0.015
attainment
(Bachelor’s degree
or higher)
percentage change
in population, 20002015
Median age change -0.304**
(years), 2000-2015
Population density 0.506**
change (number of
people) per square
mile, 2000-2015
Median household -0.295**
income percentage
change, 1999-2015
N=
159

0.492**

0.184**

0.640**

GA: Dem.
Gov. Vote
Average
Percent
Change,
1998-2014

OH: Dem.
Gov. Vote
Average
Percent
Change,
1998-2014

TX: Dem.
Gov. Vote
Average
Percent
Change,
1998-2014

0.379**

0.236*

0.057

0.047

0.044

0.288**

-0.023

0.433**

0.032

-0.255**

0.129

0.056

-0.370**

-0.123

-0.218**

0.009

0.003

0.194

0.475**

0.294**

-.106

0.384**

-0.402**

-0.41

-0.324**

-0.166

0.047

88

254

159

88

254

Significance: *p <0.05
**p < 0.01

Significance: *p <0.05 **p < 0.01
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1

The sources for the data for calculating the dependent variable are the Florida Department of
State (2017), the Georgia Secretary of State (2017), and the North Carolina State Board of
Elections (2017).
2

Urban Counties -- U.S. Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of 1,000,000 or more
people (as of 2015):
GEORGIA
1. Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA MSA (5,614,323)
OHIO
1. Cleveland-Elyria, OH MSA (2,077,240)
2. Columbus, OH MSA (1,836,536)
3. Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN MSA (Ohio counties only) (1,624,983)
TEXAS
1. Dallas-Fort-Worth-Arlington, TX MSA (6,003,967)
2. Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX MSA (5,539,949)
3. San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX MSA (1,942,217)
4. Austin-Round Rock, TX MSA (1,513,565)
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